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THEY ASKED FOR PROTECTION AND THEY GOT POLICY:
INTERNATIONAL PRIMA TE'S MUTILATED MONKEYS
The United States Supreme Court recently refused to review the decision
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in International Primate Protection
League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc. I The court of appeals had af-
firmed a lower court ruling that several animal rights groups lacked standing to
protect fifteen macaque monkeys from inhumane treatment in a research
laboratory, and could not get custody of the monkeys.'
International Primate is significant for several reasons. It is an excellent
example of the difficulties animal rights advocates typically encounter in litiga-
tion. By refusing to review the case, the Supreme Court allowed a very ques-
tionable interpretation of a key Supreme Court case, Sierra Club v. Morton, 3
to go uncorrected. Also, the true purpose of the Animal Welfare Act4 in
regulating scientific experiments on animals remains ambiguous. Finally, the
surviving monkeys continue to suffer, and their fate is still being debated.'
In the next sections, this note will discuss animal rights litigation in
general, examine the facts and background of International Primate, analyze
the decision, suggest an alternate means of review for the plaintiffs, and
discuss the present situation and ramifications of the case.
ANIMAL RIGHTS CONCERNS AND LITIGATION
In recent years, the legal community has expressed a growing concern for
animals, particularly those used in scientific research. Various commentators
have proposed ways to give laboratory animals more protection. The proposals
include a model for state legislation regulating the use of animals in research
aimed at correcting inadequacies in state anti-cruelty statutes6; stronger federal
1799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), reh k denied Oct. 7, 1986, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1624 (1987).
'Id. at 935. When the suit began, seventeen monkeys were involved. By the time the decision was rendered,
two had died. Id. at 936, n.3.
3405 U.S. 727 (1972). In this case, the Sierra Club, a conservationist organization interested in the preserva-
tion of national parks and forests, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against federal officials. The
Sierra Club wanted to prevent commercial development of the Mineral King Valley, a quasi-wilderness area
in California. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, but the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the club lacked standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act requires that the plaintiff show individualized injury, economic or otherwise.
Id. at 734-35.
'7 U.S.C. Sections 2131-2156 (1985). For a discussion of the history of the Act and how its provisions have
been implemented, see generally Note, The Animal Welfare Act: Still a Cruelty to Animals, 7 B.C. ENvTL.
AFF. L. REV. 129 (1978).
'See Reinhold, Fate of Monkeys, Deformed for Science, Causes Human Hurt After 6 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1987, at 8, col. 1. Also, some of the animal rights advocates involved in International Primate in-
tend to appeal the decision in a related case, in their effort to get custody of the monkeys. Telephone inter-
view with Edward L. Genn, attorney for the appellants (Aug. 2, 1987).
'Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 205, 23144 (1975).
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legislation regulating the use of laboratory animals'; using public nuisance
laws to give animal rights groups a cause of action against unjustifiable
research'; establishing new legal standards which reflect real concern for
animals and provide more realistic remedies'; and expanding the concept of
legal rights to recognize that natural objects have inalienable rights like
humans. 0
This concern for animals is also evident in litigation. Generally, at least
one of three legal obstacles stands between animal rights advocates and the
relief they request: standing, statutory interpretation and public policy. A
survey of some animal rights cases will illustrate how these obstacles operate.
Two cases involve standing problems. In Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n,
Inc. (AL VA) v. Weinberger," an animal rights organization attempted to en-
join the Navy from shooting feral goats on Navy property. The organization
claimed that the Navy's shooting violated the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act (NEPA). 1 The court stated that ALVA needed to demonstrate two
things to obtain standing: "injury-in-fact" and an "injury arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected" by the NEPA." The court held that ALVA
did not have standing because it had not existed long enough before the law-
suit was brought, suggesting that ALVA had been formed solely to pursue that
particular suit. 4 According to the court, this meant that ALVA did not have
an organizational or personal stake in the outcome of the litigation and thus
failed the injury-in-fact requirement." The court did note that another
organization, Fund for Animals, had been given standing to sue in two
previous lawsuits, indicating that a right of action did exist in the NEPA. 6 But
the court suggested that ALVA would have failed the zone of interests test
because its injury was only psychological and abstract."
In Walz v. Baum, 11 the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent New
York State officials from using allegedly cruel methods to slaughter animals.
The plaintiff claimed that the officials had violated the cruelty to animals sec-
'Note, Use of Animals in Medical Research: The Need for Governmental Regulation, 24 WAYNE L. REV.
1733, 1749-51 (1978).
'Comment, Creating a Private Cause ofAction Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 399,
420 (1986).
'Note, Legal Definitions of Cruelty and Animal Rights, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 147, 151 (1978).
,*Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights For Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450
(1972).
"765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985)
11Id. at 938.
"Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972)).
'Id. at 939.
"Ild.
16ld.
"Id. at 938-39.
1842 A.D.2d 643, 345 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (memorandum opinion).
[Vol. 2 1:1
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tion of the state Agriculture and Markets Law. 9 The court held that the plain-
tiff lacked standing as a citizen and taxpayer because the plaintiff had no per-
sonal or property rights at stake.2" The courts also indicated that there was no
statutory right to relief available to the plaintiff.2
American Horse Protection Ass'n, Inc. v. Frizzelln is an example of the
second obstacle animals rights advocates encounter - statutory interpreta-
tion. The American Horse Protection Association sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief against federal and state defendants, claiming that a roundup of
wild horses violated the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and/or Burros Act (Wild
Horses Act) and the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)2 3 The
court found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue by showing an injury-in-fact
and that the injury was to an interest arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected. ' But the court denied relief, holding that the roundup did not
violate either Act.2 The court found that the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) was authorized to conduct the roundup under the Wild Horses Act and
the BLM's actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious.16 In making this find-
ing, the court noted that the Wild Horses Act gave the Secretary of the In-
terior much discretion. 7 The court also found that the defendants did not
violate the NEPA and were not, therefore, required to file an environmental
impact statement, because the roundup would not significantly affect the en-
vironment.2 The court indicated that "[tihis may have been a different case
had plaintiff been able to satisfy the Court that the proposed round up [sic]
would extinguish the wild horse population in Stone Cabin Valley."29
Policy considerations are demonstrated by the decisions in Jones v.
Beame30 and New Jersey Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
Board of Education. 31 In Jones v. Jones, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against New York City officials providing inadequate care to
zoo animals." The court affirmed the lower court order to dismiss, holding that
the judiciary should not interfere with municipal budget allocations, especially
"Id. at 160.
"Id.
211d
1403 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Nev. 1975).
I3 d at 1208, 1212.
"
41d. at 1214.
2Id. at 1215, 1218-19.
26 d. at 1217-18.
"Id. at 1217.
nid. at 1219.
29 d.
-'45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978).
"191 N.J. Super. 81, 219 A.2d 200 (Essex County Ct. 1966), affd per curiam, 49 J.J. 15, A.2d 506.
"45 N.Y.2d at 407, 380 N.E.2d at 279, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
NOTES
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during a fiscal crisis." In New Jersey Society, the court held that a high school
student's experiments inducing cancer in live chickens did not violate the state
anti-cruelty statute because the motives were "purely scientific and educa-
tional."3"
Two cases in which animal rights advocates succeeded contain notably
progressive opinions. In Humane Society of Rochester and Monroe County,
Inc. v. Lyng,35 the plaintiff organization obtained standing because the
"Humane Society is specifically authorized under New York State law to pro-
secute violations of animal cruelty laws."36 The plaintiffs also proved that
facial branding of dairy cows by the hot-iron method, as recommended by
government agencies, violated the anti-cruelty laws." The court additionally
commented:
It is evident to me, as it should have been to the Department of
Agriculture, that the type of branding espoused ... constitutes cruelty to
animals. If the [defendants] had been as concerned with cruelty to animals
as they now claim to be, [the method] would never have been adopted. 8
In Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 39 the plaintiffs also obtained standing,4° and
convinced the court that a federal waiver permitting importation of baby fur
seal skins violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act.' The court was willing
to adjudicate the case even if plaintiffs had not satisfied standing requirements.
In dictum, the court stated:
Where an act is expressly motivated by considerations of humaneness
toward animals, who are uniquely incapable of defending their own in-
terests in court, it strikes us as eminently logical to allow groups specifical-
ly concerned with animal welfare to invoke the aid of the courts in enforc-
ing the statute.42
As will be seen, the three obstacles discussed in this brief overview all had
a bearing on the decision in International Primate.
THE FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Dr. Edward Taub was the director of the Behavioral Biology Center of the
Institute for Behavioral Research (IBR), a private research facility in
331d.
1491 N.J. Super at 94, 219 A.2d at 208.
31633 F. Supp. 480 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
3Id. at 485.
11Id. at 487.
3Sld.
39561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
411d. at 1006.
"Id. at 1014.
4Id. at 1007.
[Vol. 2 1:1
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Maryland."3 Taub was studying the capacity of monkeys to learn to use their
limbs after the sensory nerves to their arms and shoulders had been severed at
the spinal cord." These experiments were supposed to benefit humans suffer-
ing from neurological injuries.45 Taub's project was funded by the National In-
stitute of Health (NIH), a federal agency.46
In May, 1981, Taub hired Alex Pacheco as a volunteer lab assistant to
help with the experiments. At that time, Pacheco was an undergraduate stu-
dent at George Washington University.47 According to the opinion in Interna-
tional Primate, these experiments "amplified" Taub's earlier research. 48 The ap-
pellants supplied evidence that these experiments not only "amplified"
previous research, but that they were also needlessly repetitive and that the
NIH even questioned their value.49 The appellants also claimed that these ex-
periments were pointless and extremely cruel.5" In the course of his work,
Pacheco discovered that the monkeys were receiving inadequate care." He
asked "other researchers" to visit the laboratory to confirm his findings.52 Ac-
tually, these "other researchers" included experts on primates and other
respected scientists.53 After collecting affidavits and photographs, Pacheco
3International Primate, 799 F.2d at 936.
"Id. at 936. See also Reinhold, supra note 5, at 8, col. 5.
41799 F.2d at 936.
4Id.
41Id. Pacheco had been involved with animal rights since 1978, and co-founded People for the Ethical Treat-
ment of Animals (PETA), one of the appellants, in 1980. See Pacheco and Francione, The Silver Springs
Monkeys, in IN DEFENCE OF ANIMALS 135 (P. Singer ed. 1985).
"1799 F.2d at 936.
4"Brief for Appellant at 19-20.
"NId at 2, 6. See also Pacheco and Francione, supra note 47, at 136-39. Here Pacheco describes the ex-
periments and the injuries the monkeys suffered. "Twelve ... had disabled limbs as a result of surgical in-
terference (deafferentation) when they were juveniles .... According to a later count, thirty-nine of the
fingers on the monkey's deafferented hands were severely deformed or missing, having been either torn or
bitten off .... The monkeys also suffered from... wounds that were self-inflicted or inflicted by monkeys
grabbing at them from adjoining cages. I saw discoloured, exposed muscle tissue on their arms. Two
monkeys had bones protruding through their flesh. Several had bitten off their own fingers and had festering
stubs." Pacheco also describes one of the experiments, an "acute noxious stimuli test," in which a monkey is
strapped by the waist, ankles, wrists and neck into a homemade immobilizing chair. The acute noxious
stimuli were then applied with a pair of surgical pliers while observers watched which parts of the monkey
felt pain. One of the monkeys "had been in such bad shape that he had begun to mutilate his own chest cavi-
ty, and [a lab assistant] ... confided that putting him in a restraining device, and administering the noxious
stimuli test, with his chest ripped open, and having to experience the stench of his rotting body, was the most
disgusting thing she had ever done. After the acute pain test, she said, he was destroyed."
"Id. at 136-41. In addition to the tiny, filthy cages, Pacheco noted that no one properly bandaged the
monkeys limbs, that the monkeys went for many days without being fed, that no one cleaned the cages and
lab rooms regularly, and that Taub never used a verterinarian. See also Comment, supra note 8, at 406: "In
one of his grant applications, Taub proposed to spend fifty-five cents per day on maintenance for each
monkey, whereas the national average for care for normal monkeys was $2.50 to $4.00 per day. When the
police went into his laboratory, they discovered monkeys with open wounds from self-amputation and a
disturbing lack of hygiene, including cages 'caked with feces.' Further investigation uncovered substantial
evidence of a lack of veterinary care for Taub's monkeys." (footnotes omitted).
"1799 F.2d at 936.
"Brief for Appellant at 23, 24. See also Pacheco and Francione, supra note 47, at 141. These experts includ-
ed Dr. Geza Teleki, a noted primatologist; Dr. Michael Fox, a veterinarian and ethologist; Dr. Ronnie
NOTES
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asked the Montgomery County Police Department to investigate IBR for
violations of the Maryland animal cruelty statutes. The police seized the seven-
teen monkeys and the state charged Taub with seventeen criminal violations
of the statutes.54 The appellants took temporary custody of the monkeys."
Later, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ordered the transfer of the
monkeys to an NIH facility in Maryland. This order was to remain in effect
"'until further order of this Court or the termination of the pending criminal
prosecution against Dr. Taub, whichever occurs first."'56
Taub was convicted on six of the seventeen counts." Concerned that the
custody order would partially expire and Taub regain custody with the acquit-
tal of eleven counts, the animal rights groups filed suit in the circuit court nam-
ing IBR and NIH as defendants.5" They claimed that IBR violations of the
Maryland animal cruelty statutes extended beyond those established by the
criminal trial. They also alleged violations of the federal Animal Welfare Act.
They asked the court for custody of the monkeys, and for an injunction
preventing the defendants from keeping the monkeys.59
After an appeal and new trial, Taub's convictions were reduced to one
count of cruelty to animals. ° The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction, holding that the statute did not apply to federally-funded
research.61
In December, 1981, the suit against IBR and NIH was removed to the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland.62 In January, 1985,
the court adopted a federal magistrate's recommendation to dismiss for lack of
Hawkins, a physician and primate authority; Dr. John McArdle, a primate anatomist; and Donald Barnes, a
psychologist with primate experience.
5799 F.2d at 936.
"Brief for Appellant at 26-27. In discussing the events leading to the civil lawsuit, the court does not
recognize that appellants had, or even claimed to have, custody of the monkeys after they were seized from
IBR. However, the opinion notes that the date of seizure was September 11 and that on October 9, the cir-
cuit court ordered the monkeys to be transferred to an NIH facility. 799 F.2d at 936. The court does not say
where the monkeys were between seizure and transfer. They had to have been somewhere. For the purposes
of this Note, the appellants' claim of temporary custody and care during this period will be presumed
truthful. See id. at 938, discussing the appellants' "maintenance payments," "transfer receipt," and "volun-
tary offer to help." These items suggest that the court implicitly acknowledged the appellants' custody of the
monkeys. See also Pacheco and Francione, supra note 47, at 141-43, where the events of this period are
chronicled more fully. According to this version, the monkeys first stayed at an activist's home; then were
taken to an unnamed location (still in the apparent control of the animal rights group) because it was feared
that the monkeys would be returned to IBR; and eventually were returned to IBR, until the court order to
transfer them to the NIH facility.
"799 F.2d at 936.
"Id. (referring to State of Maryland v. Edward Taub, Criminal Number, 11848-81).
"Id. at 936.
"Id. at 936-37.
6Id. at 937.
"Id. (citing Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983)). Butsee Comment, supra note 8, at 410. "Less
than a year later the state legislature amended the law to make it clear that the prohibitions did extend to all
experiments involving animals." (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, Secton 59 (Supp. 1985)).
62799 F.2d at 937. 6
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standing.63 The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals."
THE DECISION
The court of appeals held that the appellants failed the injury-in-fact re-
quirement for standing and that the Animal Welfare Act did not provide a
private right of action to the appellants.65 The appellants claimed they had suf-
fered two kinds of injuries, economic and personal. 66
As for their economic injuries, the appellants claimed their tax payments
entitled them to ensure enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act.67 The court
responded that United States v. Richardson6 denied taxpayer authority to pur-
chase regulatory enforcement. 69 The appellants also claimed that their care of
the monkeys during temporary custody was an economic injury.70 The court
regarded this claim as merely a voluntary offer to help, precluding any owner-
ship of interest in the monkeys.7" The court reasoned that, "like attorney's fees
or other litigation costs, the maintenance payments were part of the response
to the contested conduct, not part of the conduct itself, and therefore do not
establish a 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.'
72
As for their personal injuries, the appellants claimed to be:
individuals and members having a personal interest in the preservation
and encouragement of civilized and humane treatment of animals, whose
own aesthetic, conservational, and environmental interests are specifical-
ly and particularly offended and affected by the matters hereinafter
described, and which interests, along with their educational interests, will
be detrimentally impacted upon if the relief sought is not granted.73
The court rejected this statement of interest because it resembled "the pleading
that the Supreme Court found to be inadequate in Sierra Club v. Morton...
[where the] Court held that 'a mere interest in a problem; [sic] no matter how
longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in
evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to create standing. 74
'
3Id.
"Id.
51d. at 935, 938.
6ld. at 937. Although the court refers to the appellants"injuries as financial and non-financial, this Note will
use the more commonly used terms, economic and personal, to facilitate analogies to other cases.
671d.
6-418 U.S. 166 (1974).
619799 F.2d at 937-38.
710 d. at 938.
71Id.
7ld. (citing Baker v. Canr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
"Id. at 938.
14 d. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).
NOTES
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The second kind of personal injury the appellants claimed was the disrup-
tion of their relationships with the monkeys.75 The court rejected this as an in-
effective analogy to parties injured by disturbances to national parks because
they use those areas.76 The court found that the plaintiffs in International
Primate "have been with the monkeys primarily because of this litigation...
[and] could not see the monkeys in the IBR laboratory if the defendants
satisfied all the requirements of care."77 The court also compared this claim to
the claim in AL VA v. Weinberger, 7' challenging the Navy's shooting of goats.
According to the International Primate court, the ALVA court "found that
the plaintiff had suffered no injury because its members could not be with the
goats and therefore could not claim the direct personal involvement necessary
for standing."7 9
The court gave a number of reasons for deciding that the Animal Welfare
Act did not provide a private right of action. First, it was the intent of Con-
gress to keep the administrative supervision subordinate to "the continued in-
dependence of research scientists."80 Second, the only remedial scheme the Act
provided for was judicial review for an aggrieved research facility."' Third, the
judiciary is not equipped to deal with "problems and requirements of
biomedical research," and must exercise restraint. 2 Fourth, damage awards
would discourage scientists from pursuing research."3 Finally, animals play an
important and necessary part in medical progress.'
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The court's determination that the appellants suffered no economic injury
in caring for the monkeys is arguable. Characterizing the appellants' actions as
voluntary, and finding that they did not acquire an ownership interest in the
monkeys seem irrelevant to evaluating a claim of economic injury. The ap-
pellants had claimed they spent more than $10,000 to adapt a home to provide
shelter for the monkeys, and for food and veterinary care. 5 But the court
dismissed this expenditure as being ". . . part of the response to the contested
conduct, not part of the conduct itself," comparing it to attorneys' fees and
7 Id. at 938.
761d. (construing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8).
7"Id. at 938.
71765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985).
79799 F.2d at 938.
"ld. at 939.
"Id. at 940.
82Id.
83Id.
84Id.
"Brief for Appellant at 26-27. See Pacheco and Francione, supra note 47, at 141. A local activist's basement
was installed with new drains, windows, ventilation, insulation, and new cages were built in order to care for
the monkeys.
[Vol. 2 1:1
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court costs.8" The court used the Baker v. Carr "personal stake in the outcome
of the litigation" test as authority for this distinction." The point the court was
trying to make is difficult to understand. Was it saying that the appellants' ex-
penditure did not stem from the controversy, but was instead peripheral to it?
This view seems illogical, because the expenditure was made before the suit
was filed, unlike fees and costs. Moreover, because the controversy was about
custody of the monkeys, how could the expenditure be considered peripheral
to that controversy? The court's distinction between response to the contested
conduct and part of the conduct seems irrelevant to establishing a personal
stake in the outcome of the litigation.
The court's analysis of the appellants' personal injuries also warrants
careful examination. The court found that the appellants' statement of interest
resembled the inadequate pleading in Sierra Club. The Sierra Court did find
the Sierra Club's pleadings to be inadequate. But they were inadequate because
the organization did not assert the individualized injuries of its members. In
fact, the Sierra Court virtually reprimanded the organization's impersonal
statement of interest:
The Club apparently regarded any allegations of individualized in-
jury as superfluous, on the theory that this was a 'public' action involving
questions as to the use of natural resources, and that the Club's longstan-
ding concern with and expertise in such matters were sufficient to give it
standing as a 'representative of the public.' This theory reflects a
misunderstanding of our cases involving so-called 'public actions' in the
area of administrative law.8
The Court further explained that the Sierra Club "specifically declines to rely
on its individualized interest, as a basis for standing."89 Yet the Court sug-
gested that the Sierra Club could correct the pleading flaw by amending its
complaint.90 Thus, the appellants' statement of interest in International
Primate does not at all resemble that of the Sierra Club. The appellants in In-
ternational Primate specifically charactized their injuries as belonging to in-
dividual members.
A second problem the International Primate court had with the ap-
pellants' statement of interest also misrepresents Sierra Club. Apparently, the
court interpreted the following passage from Sierra Club to mean that a "mere
interest" does not confer standing:
It is clear that an organization whose members are injured may represent
those members in a proceeding for judicial review.... But a mere 'interest
"799 F.2d at 938.
rId (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 204).
"405 U.S. at 736.
"Id. at 735 n.8.
90d.
NOTES
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in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how
qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by
itself to render the organization 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' within
the meaning of the APA. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).9'
Actually, the Sierra Court was simply re-emphasizing the need to assert in-
dividual injury, even though those individuals are also represented by an
organization. In other words, an organizational interest alone does not satisfy
the requirement for individual injury. Again, the appellants' injury claim in In-
ternational Primate is vindicated by an accurate reading of Sierra Club.
In its analysis of the appellants' injury based on disruption of their per-
sonal relationships with the monkeys, the court's reasoning suffers from fac-
tual and logical errors. It correctly reasoned that the Sierra Court would have
approved a pleading alleging that members were deprived the use of a park or
forest.92 The International Primate court stated that the appellants had been
with the monkeys only because of the litigation, and would not have been able
to see the monkeys in the IBR laboratory had defendants cared for the
monkeys properly." Apparently the court forgot that the appellants were with
the monkeys before the litigation commenced, and that Pacheco worked as
Taub's lab assistant. (Even more striking, the court virtually acknowledged
that the defendants did not care for the monkeys adequately.) Because it sum-
marily dispensed with this personal injury claim, the court overlooked the time
appellants spent with the monkeys in the IBR laboratory, their custody of the
monkeys, and the relationships which developed.94 Certainly, this is precisely
the kind of individualized injury claim the Sierra Court wanted.
The International Primate court's use of ALVA is also questionable. It
stated that the AL VA court found that the plaintiff in that case "could not be
with the goats and therefore could not claim the direct personal involvement
necessary for standing." 95 While the AL VA court did find an insufficient per-
sonal stake, the finding was not based on an inability to "be with the goats." In
fact, "being with the goats" is nowhere discussed in the AL VA opinion. Ac-
tually, the ALVA court held that the organization lacked the "longevity and
indicia of commitment to preventing inhumane behavior," suggesting that the
organization existed only to pursue that lawsuit.96 Thus, the International
Primate court's use of ALVA to support its denial of standing, and its curious
"be with the goats" language, are at best misleading.
The conclusion that the International Primate court erroneously analyzed
91405 U.S. at 739.
91799 F.2d at 938. See 405 U.S. at 735, 736 n.8.
"1799 F.2d at 938.
14See supra notes, 50, 53, 55 & 85.
"1799 F.2d at 938.
6765 F.2d at 939.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2 1:1
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the appellants' injury-in-fact claims seems inescapable. But did the court cor-
rectly find that the Animal Welfare Act does not provide a right of action? To
be sure, the Act provides only for administrative supervision and enforcement,
and judicial review is provided for aggrieved research facilities.97 However,
perhaps other provisions should be considered in determining whether the Act
provides a right of action. For instance, it requires the Secretary of Agriculture
to:
-.. require, at least annually, every research facility to show that profes-
sionally acceptable standards governing the care, treatment, and use of
animals, including appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic and tranquiliz-
ing drugs, during experimentation are being followed by the research
facility during actual research or experimentation. 8
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court indicated the extent of the
Secretary's power to enforce the Act. Discussing statutory provisions for
federal court enforcement, the Court noted that:
Exemplary language is contained in the Animal Welfare Act of 1970
which provides for inspections by the Secretary of Agriculture; federal
district courts are vested with jurisdiction 'specifically to enforce, and to
prevent and restrain violations of this chapter, and shall have jurisdiction
in all other kinds of cases arising under this chapter."0
Recent legislation has increased protection for laboratory animals by re-
quiring that NIH-funded facilities establish animal care committees consisting
of a veterinarian and a person with no financial ties to the facility.'' It must
also be remembered that the Animal Welfare Act was intended to "deal with
the abuses that have developed as a result of the Nation's vast program of
medical research," particularly research involving experimentation with
animals. 10 Congress recently strengthened its statement of policy at the begin-
ning of the Act, stating that:
(1) the use of animals is instrumental in certain research and education for
advancing knowledge of cures and treatment for diseases and injuries
which afflict both humans and animals;
(2) methods of testing that do not use animals are being and continue to be
developed which are faster, less expensive, and more accurate than tradi-
tional animal experiments for some purposes and further opportunities ex-
ist for the development of these methods of testing;
977 U.S.C. Section 2146 (1985).
"Id., Section 2143 (a).
-436 U.S. 307 (1978).
"OId. at 322 n.19.
"'Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-158.
101S. Rep. No. 1281, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 2635,
2636.
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(3) measures which eliminate or minimize the unnecessary duplication of
experiments on animals can result in more productive use of Federal
funds; and
(4) measures which help meet the public concern for laboratory animal
care and treatment are important in assuring that research will continue
to progress. (emphasis added). 103
Keeping these considerations in mind, if the Animal Welfare Act by itself did
not, another federal statute may have supplied the necessary right of action for
the appellants.
THE APA
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)104 should have given the ap-
pellants in International Primate a right of action. It provides: "A person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof."' 10 In Sierra Club, the Supreme Court stated that standing is
available through the APA if the party shows an injury-in-fact, and if the in-
jury is to an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statutes that the agencies allegedly violated.' °6 The Court
also stated that non-economic injuries are as viable as economic injuries, so
long as the party seeking review be himself among the injured.107
The real issue, then, is whether the appellants' injuries in International
Primate were arguably within the zone of interests protected or regulated by
the Animal Welfare Act. This would certainly seem to be the case. A ruling by
the Supreme Court in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean
Society"8 supports this view. In Japan Whaling, wildlife conservation groups
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Commerce to fulfill
duties the plaintiffs claimed were required by the Pelly and Packwood Amend-
ments in order to protect sperm whales."°9 The Court found that there was a
justiciable controversy despite the defendant's political question contention."0
The Court also indicated that the APA would have given the plaintiffs a cause
of action:
We also reject the Secretary's suggestion that no private cause of action
is available to respondents... [Tihe suit, in essence is one to 'compel agen-
1037 U.S.C. Section 2131 (1985).
1045 U.S.C. Section 702 (1982).
105/Id
10405 U.S. at 733.
107 d at 734-35.
10106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986).
'Id. at 2865.
"OId. at 2866.
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cy action unlawfully withheld,' 5 USC Sec. 706(1), or alternatively, to
'hold unlawful and set aside agency action ... found to be ... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.' Sec. 706(2)(A). The 'right of action' in such cases is expressly created
by the Administrative Procedure Act.... A separate indication of con-
gressional intent to make agency action reviewable under the APA is not
necessary; instead the rule is that the cause of action for review of such ac-
tion is available absent some clear and convincing evidence of legislative
intention to preclude review. (emphasis added).",
Recently, in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, "I the Court said:
We have most recently reaffirmed this liberal reading of the review
provisions of the APA in Japan Whaling Association v. American Ceta-
cean Society (citations omitted).... We [held] that respondents had a right
of action 'expressly created by the Administrative Procedure Act.. . .' We
held further.., that 'a separate indication of congressional intent to make
'113agency action reviewable under the APA is not necessary....
Granted, the Animal Welfare Act does not authorize the Secretary of
Agriculture to regulate the design of research projects." ' But it does direct the
Secretary to supervise the care research facilities give to animals, and em-
powers the Secretary to investigate facilities suspected of mistreating
animals." '5 The Act also empowers the Secretary to remove an animal found to
be suffering."' It is important to remember that the Act was intended to pro-
tect the animals; it certainly does not entitle research facilities to abuse them.
Given the Supreme Court's language in Japan Whaling and Clarke, its recogni-
tion of judicial enforcement of the Secretary's investigatory powers in Mar-
shall v. Barlow's, Inc., stronger Congressional policy and measures that in-
creased protection for the animals, and the absence of legislative intent to
preclude review, one may propose that the Department of Agriculture's failure
to supervise IBR was indeed "agency action unlawfully withheld," and that
NIH's funding was an "abuse of discretion," according to the standards in
Japan Whaling. 117
THE PRESENT SITUATION
In June, 1986, the monkeys were taken to Delta Regional Primate
Research Center in Louisiana, a unit of Tulane University Medical Center."'
111 d, n.4.
1-2107 S. Ct. 750 (1987).
"'Id. at 755 n.9.
11-7 U.S.C. 2143 (1985).
'Id., Section 2146.
"
61d
"
"1106 S. Ct. at 2866, n.4.
"'Reinhold, supra note 5, at 8, col. 1.
NOTESSummer, 19871
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There are fourteen of the original seventeen monkeys left. One monkey died
while in Delta's custody." 9 This monkey was reportedly healthy, having been
used as a control animal in Taub's experiments.120 However, Delta destroyed
his body before an autopsy could be performed.' Delta and NIH are consider-
ing destroying the remaining monkeys.' The animal rights groups oppose this
plan and are still trying to get custody of the monkeys.'
NIH stopped funding Taub's experiments."'
A number of bills dealing in various ways with abuses in animal research
have been introduced in Congress. None have been given very high odds of
passage. 2 One of these bills calls for transferring the International Primate
monkeys to Primarily Primates, Inc., the animal sanctuary where appellants
intend to keep the monkeys if they get custody.'26 It seems unlikely that it will
be passed. 7
CONCLUSION
It was noted that at least one of three legal barriers - standing, statutory
interpretation, and policy - usually frustrates animal rights litigants. All three
barriers determined the outcome of International Primate. Perhaps the most
influential was policy. In the beginning of the opinion, the court made this
observation:
To imply a cause of action in these plaintiffs might entail serious con-
sequences. It might open the use of animals in biomedical research to the
hazards and vicissitudes of courtroom litigation. It may draw judges into
the supervision and regulation of laboratory research. It might unleash a
spate of private lawsuits that would impede advances made by medical
science in the alleviation of human suffering. To risk consequences of this
magnitude in the absence of clear direction from the Congress would be
"'Telephone interviews with Patrice Green, PETA Research and Investigation Staff (Feb.-Mar. 1987).
1 id.
12id.
'Reinhold, supra note 5, at 8, col. 1.
"'id Edward L. Genn, attorney for the appellants in International Primate, plans to appeal a related deci-
sion. Telephone interview (Aug. 2, 1987).
" Rheinhold, supra note 5, at 8, col. 5.
12Among the bills introduced in the 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987) are: H.R. 2594, proposing an amendment
to the Animal Welfare Act to prohibit unnecessary surgery or alteration of animals; H.R. 241, proposing an
amendment to the Act respecting temporary restraining orders and injunctions; H.R. 1708, aimed at pro-
moting improved dissemination of biomedical data to prevent duplication of experiments on live animals;
and H.R. 778, proposing restrictions on NIH-funded research using animals acquired from shelters. S. 1457,
which mirrors H.R. 778, was recently introduced in the Senate. Odds that each will pass the various
legislative stages are formulated by George Mason University and available on Billcast (LEXIS, Genfed
library).
"16H.R. 2883, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), was introduced July 1, 1987, by Rep. Robert Smith. See also
Reinhold, supra note 5, at 8, col. 5. Smith and 229 members of Congress cosponsored a similar bill last year.
1"Billcast (LEXIS, Genfed library).
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ill-advised. In fact, we are persuaded that Congress intended that the in-
dependence of medical research be respected and that the administrative
enforcement govern the Animal Welfare Act.'28
These policy concerns are evident in the court's interpretation of the Animal
Welfare Act.'2 For purposes of comparison, it is worth repeating the inter-
pretation given the Marine Mammal Protection Act by the court in Animal
Welfare Inst. v. Kreps: "Where an act is expressly motivated by considerations
of humaneness toward animals, who are uniquely incapable of defending their
own interests in court, it strikes us as eminently logical to allow groups
specifically concerned with animal welfare to invoke the aid of the courts in
enforcing the statute.' 30
How the Supreme Court would have decided International Primate re-
mains to be seen. Interestingly, the Court permitted the Animal Welfare Inst.
decision to stand.'3' Also, although the Court in Japan Whaling ultimately
decided against the animal rights groups on the basis of statutory interpreta-
tion, Justice Marshall wrote a dissent in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun
and Rehnquist joined. The dissenting opinion strongly disagreed with the ma-
jority's interpretation of the statute involved. 3 1 It ended with a powerful ap-
peal for preservation of an endangered species. 33
For whatever reason, the Supreme Court chose not to review Interna-
tional Primate. But given the growing concern for animals in the legal com-
munity and legislature, it seems likely that issues dealing with research
animals, like those posed by International Primate, will eventually need to be
resolved.
MARCI MESSET"
In799 F.2d at 935.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
13561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
13id.
13106 S. Ct. at 2875 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1id. at 2876.
NOTESSummer, 1987]
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